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Chapter pages in book: (p. 25 - 30)ships to the economy of the future. Rising commodity prices and
taxes, and the relatively low level of stock prices, we have seen,
have all encouraged bond and discouraged stock financing since
the war. Similar changes have affected the relationship between
stock and bond financing in the past and may well affect it in the
future.
AGGREGATE DEFAULT AND SETTLEMENT EXPERIENCE
ON CORPORATE BOND INVESTMENTS
A corporate bond default is defined as the failure to pay principal
or interest promptly when due. Comprehensive data on corporate
bond defaults in major industry and size groups will be presented
in the volume on which this paper is based. The series are of the
interrelated "stock-flow" type used generally throughout the in-
vestigation. They. provide annual estimates of the volume of bonds
outstanding in default, of new defaults, of default settlements
(bonds previously in default that were restored to good standing,
extinguished through reorganization, etc.), and of the net change
in outstanding defaults (new defaults less default settlements).
Ancillary estimates are also provided for special categories of new
defaults and settlements. More detailed breakdowns by minor
industry groups and other classifications will be presented in a later
monograph. Chart 7 gives the picture for all industries combined,
and the discussion will bring in some of the differences between
major industry groups.
Between 1900 and the onset of the Great Depression the
aggregate volume of corporate bonds outstanding in default was
quite small, both in absolute and in relative terms. During this
period the average par amount of bonds outstanding in default
was only $0.4 billion or 2.7 percent of total outstandings. With
the financial difficulties of the early thirties, outstanding defaults
climbed rapidly to a peak level in 1936 of about $4 billion or 15
percent of outstandings. Although there was a mild improvement
in 1936-37, the situation again deteriorated and the amount out-
standing in default in 1940 was about as large as in 1936. After
that, default settlements generally exceeded new defaults, so that
the volume of outstanding defaults declined.
25Since rail bonds dominated the market for corporate bonds over
most of the first three decades of this century, one would expect
them to occupy a predominant position in corporate bond defaults.
Actually, they accounted for less than half of the total volume of
bonds outstanding in default in the majority of the years from 1900
to 1933. The proportion of rail bonds in default during this period
was usually well below that of the other major industry groups,
rarely exceeding 4 or 5 percent. Between 1931 and 1940 the status
of rail bonds deteriorated rapidly, the percentage in default climb-
ing from 0.5 to 27.9. Moreover, very few of the rail defaults had
been settled by the end of the period covered by our records: at
the beginning of 1944, 26 percent of rail bonds were still in default.
The volume of utility bonds outstanding in default was fairly heavy
in the early twenties and again in the mid-thirties (about 8 percent
and 7 percent respectively), largely because of the poor perform-
ance of street railways in these years. With industrial bonds the
greatest difficulties came in the early thirties, the volume of defaults
climbing from $0.1 billion in 1.931 to $1.1 billion in 1934, or from
2 to 24 percent of industrial outstandings. By 1944, however, all
but $0.1 billion of the defaults had been settled. At that time only
4.8 percent of industrial bonds were in default; for utilities, the
proportion was only 3.5 percent. This is in marked contrast to the
rails.
As in the case of the net change in outstandings and its two
components —offeringsand extinguishments —theeffects of the
business cycle are clearly apparent in the series on new defaults,
default settlements, and net changesoutstanding defaults. The
net change in outstanding defaults in any year is highly correlated
with the volume of new defaults, and both series show high nega-
tive conformity to the business cycle, reaching peaks at or near
business troughs, and troughs at or near business peaks. The volume
of default settlements lags behind new defaults, but the lag is
irregular owing to extreme variations in the length of time required
tsettle distress situations through corporate reorganization, etc.
The latter series, therefore, shows positive but low conformity with
business cycles.
From the investors' point of view, a better measure of default
26CHART 7— Corporate Bond Defaults: Outstandings, New


















IData are for all industries combined and include straight issues only, par amount (see
Table 3, Appendix). Outstandings in default ore January figures; other series are totals
for the year.
Shaded areas in the time scale, representing contractions in general business activity,
and white areas, representing expansions, are from Arthur F.Burns and Wesley C.






'08 '12 '16 '20 '24 '28 '32
New defaults net change
"Defoult settlements NegoHve net changeexperience than the absolute volume of defaults is given by the
rate at which bonds go to default and the rate at which these
defaults are settled. As measured by the average annual default
rate calculated over the entire period 1900-1943, default exper-
ience was best on utility bonds and poorest on bonds in the indus-
trial group. During the first three decades of the century, rail bonds
had clearly the best record. Their average annual default rate fOr
this period was only 0.9 percent as against 1.5 percent for utilities
and 2.1 percent for industrials. This relative performance was
reflected in conservative investment opinion in the period before
the Great Depression, when rail bonds were favored while indus-
trials were frowned upon by conservative investors, by the com-
pilers, of the legal lists of bonds eligible for savings bank and trust
fund investment, and by the investment rating agencies.
On the basis of the depression experience, there was a pro-
nounced shift in investor preferences from rail bonds to utilities
and industrials. According to their average annual default rate
calculated over the years 1930-43, utility bonds had much the best
experience (a default rate of 1.6 percent per annum), and they
came to occupy a preferred position as outlets for funds seeking
low-risk investment. Trends in outstandings since World War II,
and present market-yield differentials, indicate that industrial
bonds are now also a preferred class of investment, while rail
bonds have taken a decidedly secondary position. It will therefore
surprise some investors to learn that the default experience with
rail bonds during the depressed thirties was actually superior to
that with industrials. Both rail and industrial bonds did poorly in
these years, but the 3.2 percent average annual default rate for
rails compared favorably with the 3.5 percent rate for industrials.
In seeking an explanation for the superior market performance
of industrial bonds as compared with rails in recent years, one must
take into account the fact that the rate at which bonds go to default
measures only one aspect of over-all investor experience. Our
analysis of default rates was therefore supplemented by a parallel
analysis of annual settlement rates. (The annual settlement rate
is the proportion of defaulted bonds outstanding at the beginning
28of the year that were settled during the year.) Averages of these
annual settlement rates for the major industry groups follow:
All Public
PERIOD industries Railroads utilities Industrials
1900-1929 33.2% 28.0% 30.9% 35.8%
1930.1943 14.1 8.4 20.9 27.0
Asthe table indicates, rail bonds had the lowest settlement rate
of the three major industry groups in both periods shown, whereas
industrial bonds had the highest. In short, rail bonds went to de-
fault slightly less frequently than industrials but remained in
default over much longer periods.
In general, the statistical records on settlement rates emphasize
the importance of the average level of earnings in the settlement of
defaults. Industrial corporations' earnings were unstable in the
thirties, but recovered rapidly, and many of their bonds were
quickly restored to good standing. From these findings we infer
that defaults were settled more quickly by obligors having a rela-
tively simple capital structure, and by obligors not subject to close
public regulation, than by others.
Another measure of investor experience with corporate bonds
is provided by the record of interest payments on funded debt. In
the present investigation, certain monthly and annual series on
interest payments have been developed, primarily for use in na-
tional income studies where previously available data of this type
have been unusually weak. These statistics, which cover the aggre-
gate volume of interest payments promised by obligors (contractual
payments) and the volume of interest actually paid (actual pay-
ments), also throw light on the ability of business enterprise to
service funded debt. The difference between contractual and
actual payment is, of course, the amount of interest in default.
These series amplify and confirm our findings as to industrial
differences in corporate bond defaults. They also show that, despite
the unusual financial disturbances of the Great Depression, the
record of American business enterprise in servicing its funded debt
has been remarkably good. Between January 1900 and January
1944 contractual interest payments aggregated $40.8 billion, and
29actual interest payments $38.4 billion. Thus over 94 percent of
all contractual interest was paid during this period, leaving only
6 percent in arrears. Moreover, in none of the years in question
did the portion of contractual interest actually paid fall below 84
percent, while in 32 of the 44 years it exceeded 95 percent. This
record does not take account, of course, of reductions in contract
rates through corporate reorganizations. It appears remarkable,
however, when compared with that of the foreign dollar bonds
offered in this country during the twenties. As late as 1950 only 58
percent of the debt service on these obligations was being met.
In the preceding paragraphs we have considered such measures
of investor experience as default rates, settlement rates, interest
receipts, and the period from default to settlement. While each
of these statistics measures an important aspect of investor exper-
ience, account should also be taken of the price paid for the invest-
ment at offering and the value of receipts at extinguishment.
Realized yield statistics, which fully reflect all of these payments,
and their timing, will be examined in a later report.
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